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ABSTRACT 
In 2013 Nina Davuluri, an Asian Indian from Syracuse, NY, became the first South Asian-American Miss 
America.  The largely congratulatory comments from South Asian bloggers while reveling in the 
significance of her win, also commented on her skin tone, characterizing the new Miss America as dark 
brown, some adding that Davuluri would have never won the Miss Indian America  USA title because she 
is “too dark.”  Early discussions of colorism, skin tone bias, by legal scholars focus on how the practice 
impacts black Americans or other persons with some African ancestry.  Yet the comments from South 
Asians about Davuluri’s skin tone sound surprisingly similar to conventional American notions of 
colorism practices.  South Asian commentators acknowledge a light-skinned preference within their 
communities but explain her selection as a national beauty queen as a preference by the dominant 
American culture for darker more “exotic” South Asians. Thus skin tone preferences impacting South 
Asians operate within and outside of their communities. What is not clear is whether intra-group or inter-
group skin tone preferences involving South Asians carry over to workplace decisions.  This inquiry is 
important because South Asians comprise a significant portion of this country’s growing non-white 
population.  Focusing on Title VII employment discrimination cases this article asks whether colorism 
among or between racialized groups impacts immigrants from South Asia and their American-born 
offspring in the same way studies suggest that skin tone discrimination adversely impacts black 
Americans and Latinos in the workplace. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013 Nina Davuluri, an Asian Indian from Syracuse, NY, became the first South Asian-
American Miss America.1 Her selection prompted racist messages on Twitter “mixing up Indian, Indian-
American, Arab, Muslim, and everything in between.”2 The racist tweets are not simply a commentary on 
racial “progress” in post-civil rights America but, more importantly from a legal perspective, illustrate the 
popularly held misunderstandings of South Asian identity. This confusion about South Asians is reflected 
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1.  Lakshmi Chaudhry, Miss America Nina Davuluri: Too ‘Indian’ to ever be Miss India, FIRST POST (Sept. 
16, 2013), http://www.firstpost.com/living/miss-america-nina-davuluri-too-indian-to-ever-be-miss-india-
1111477.html. 
2.  Alex Williams, Beauty Pageants Draw Social Media Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/fashion/beauty-pageants-draw-social-media-critics.html?_r=0 (quoting a blog 
post by Laura Beck). 
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in some employment discrimination cases. 
Asian Indians are often subsumed into a category called South Asians.3 The term “South Asian” 
normally encompasses Dalits, Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, and other Indian minorities who represent a 
larger portion of the Indian population in the United States than they do in India.4 The term “South 
Asian” is used throughout this article in the broadest sense, except where it is important to distinguish 
various subgroups.  
The largely congratulatory comments from South Asian commentators about Davuluri’s win were 
insightful in another troubling way. While reveling in the significance of her win, bloggers also 
commented on her skin tone, characterizing the new Miss America as dark brown.5 One Asian Indian 
American commentator sarcastically wrote, “That gorgeous chocolate may play as exotic in the West, but 
in India, we prefer our beauty queens strictly vanilla — preferably accessorised with blue contact 
lenses.”6 Thus it was not simply Davuluri’s win as Miss America that was deemed significant, it was her 
skin tone as well. A commentator added that Davuluri would have never won the Miss Indian America 
USA title because she is “too dark.”7 Still others added that in India someone with her skin tone would 
                                                     
3. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation consists of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. SOUTH ASIAN ASS'N FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION, CHARTER (Dec. 8, 1985).  
4. Prema Kurien, Who Speaks for Indian Americans? Religion Ethnicity, and Political Formation, 59 AM. 
Q.759, 759 (2007).  Hindu Indians do not always self-identify as South Asians reflecting political divisions within 
and outside the Asian Indian American community.  To some “South Asian organizations represent pluralist 
subcontinental groups that are explicitly against the political Hindu movement.”  Id.  at 759.  In contrast, “Hindu 
organizations represent political Hindu interests.” Id. “At the heart of the difference between Hindu and South Asian 
organizations lie two different conceptions of ‘Indianness’— a Hinducentric one that defines India as a Hindu 
country under attack from Muslims, Christians, and secularists within and without the country, and a secular, 
multireligious, multicultural conception that emphasizes the importance of developing harmonious relationships 
between groups and countries in the Indian subcontinent.” Id. at 763.  Nevertheless, the division in the Indian 
American political groups pits pan-Hindu groups (either U.S. branches of Hindu nationalist groups existing in India 
or independent Hindu American organizations) against South Asian groups (usually consisting of  
coalitions of secular Hindus, leftist South Asian academics, Dalits, Indian Muslims, Indian Sikhs, and 
Indian Christians banding together on an anti-Hindutva platform). Id.  Although divided, the Indian American 
community is seeing large gains in political influence due to their donations and India’s development as a key 
economic player. Id.at 759. 
5. Chaudhry, supra note 1. 
6. Id.  
7. Id. This point is made in the documentary film Miss India Georgia (URBAN LIFE PRODUCTIONS 1997) about 
the competition for Miss India America in Georgia.   
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never be a contestant in a beauty contest, much less the winner.8  
These comments about Davuluri’s skin tone within the Asian Indian American community add to 
our understanding of how different non-white communities process skin tone. To me her skin tone 
seemed medium brown, but this difference in perspective is unsurprising. As I have written before, skin 
tone differences are relative.9 Further, when Davuluri’s skin tone is compared with the nine other non-
white Miss Americas from 1984-2014, with two exceptions, her skin tone looks much the same as the 
other winners.10  
Early discussions of colorism by legal scholars focus on how the practice impacts black 
Americans or other persons with some African ancestry.11 Yet the comments from South Asians about 
Davuluri’s skin tone sound surprisingly similar to conventional American notions of colorism practices. 
But in Miss Davuluri’s case, the comments seem counterintuitive. South Asian commentators 
acknowledge a light-skinned preference within their communities but explain her selection as a national 
                                                     
8. Mallika Rao, Why Miss America, Nina Davuluri, ‘Would Never Win Pageants In South Asia’, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/16/miss-america-nina-skin-color_n_3935348.html. 
9. There may be significant disagreement about what constitutes skin tone difference, even within a racialized 
group.  Skin tone measurement may be egocentric in that a dark-skinned member of a racialized group may judge 
the skin tone of another [group] member based on her own skin tone.  Thus, a dark-skinned black person might rate 
another as lighter than the rating given by a light-skinned black person.  Further, in-group notions of skin tone may 
differ from the perceptions of people outside this group. Taunya Lovell Banks, A Darker Shade of Pale Revisited: 
Disaggregated Blackness and Colorism in the “Post-Racial” Obama Era, in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS 
AND THE MYTH OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA 97 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2014) (citing Mark E. Hill, Race of 
the Interviewer and Perception of Skin Color: Evidence from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, 67 AM.SOC. 
REV. 99, 100 (2002)).  
10. The nine other winners are: 1984 Vanessa Williams (first black winner) later replaced by runner-up Suzette 
Charles, also black; 1990 Debbye Turner Bell (black); 1991 Marjorie Vincent (black); 1994 Kimberly Aiken 
(black); 2001 Angela Perez Baraquio (First Asian winner); 2003 Erika Harold (multi-racial); 2004 Ericka Dunlap 
(black); 2010 Caressa Cameron (black).  One scholar on this subject noted that “Debbye Turner’s, dark, yet Anglo  
defined features and Marjorie Vincent’s classic Black features were the subject of media attention….” Elwood 
Watson, Miss America’s Racial Milestones, DIVERSE ISSUES: HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 19, 2009), 
https://diverseeducation.wordpress.com/2009/01/14/miss-americas-racial-milestones/. As of 2009 there had been no 
Latina winner. Id. 
11. See Leonard M. Baynes, If It’s Not Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer 
Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENVER U. L. 
REV. 131, 146-53 (1997) (arguing about the existence of skin tone discrimination within the black American 
community); Leonard M. Baynes, Blinded by the Light: But Now I See, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 491 (1998) (book 
review discussing the existence of intra-racial colorism among black Americans); Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: 
A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1705 (2000) (arguing that colorism is a form of race-related 
discrimination); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000) (arguing that 
colorism is a separate and distinct form of discrimination).  
8/24/15 
4 
beauty queen as a preference by the dominant American culture for darker more “exotic” South Asians. 
Thus skin tone preferences impacting South Asians operate within and outside of their communities. 
What is not clear is whether intra-group or inter-group skin tone preferences involving South Asians carry 
over to workplace decisions.  
This inquiry is important because South Asians comprise a significant portion of this country’s 
growing non-white population. There are more than three million South Asians in the United States. 12 
More specifically, ethnic Asian Indians represent the third-largest immigrant group by country of origin 
in the country today.13  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 and the older civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 198115 
prohibit discrimination based on “color,” but neither statute defines the term.16 A little more than fifteen 
years ago I argued that skin tone discrimination, whether intra-racial or inter-racial, constitutes a form of 
race-based discrimination that tends to disadvantage individuals with dark skin tones.17 With few 
exceptions, more recent discussions of this topic among legal scholars continue to focus almost 
exclusively on black Americans.18 Thus, this article asks whether colorism among or between racialized 
                                                     
12. See ASIAN AMERICAN FEDERATION & STRENGTHENING SOUTH ASIAN COMMUNITIES IN AMERICA, A 
DEMOGRAPHIC SNAPSHOT OF SOUTH ASIANS IN THE UNITED STATES (July 2012), available at http://saalt.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Demographic-Snapshot-Asian-American-Foundation-2012.pdf (estimating the U.S. 
population of South Asians, defined as Bangladeshi, Bhutanese, Indian, Maldivian, Nepali, Pakistani, and Sri 
Lankan ethnicities at 3,441,773 in 2010). 
13. Monica Whatley & Jeanna Batalova, Indian Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE 
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united-states. 
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1981).  
15. Rev. Stat. § 1977, 18 Stat. 337 (1875) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
16. Kate Sablosky Elengold, in her examination of the legislative history of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, argues that Congress often used the term “colored” interchangeably with “Negro” raising questions about 
whether the term “color” has a separate meaning.  See Kate Sablosky Elengold, Branding Identity, 93 DENV. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (arguing that the term “people of color” should not be considered the same as 
discrimination based on “color” under Title VII). 
17. Banks, supra note 11. 
18. See Banks, supra note 9; Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity 
Performance Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 657 (2010) (explaining many of the practical 
impediments plaintiffs face when bringing intra-group claims); Taunya Lovell Banks, Multilayered Racism: Courts’ 
Continued Resistance to Colorism Claims, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS 213 (Evelyn 
Nakano Glenn ed., 2009) (discussing the empirical studies on skin tone bias and the implications and law’s inability 
to address the harms of colorism); Trina Jones, The Case for Legal Recognition of Colorism Claims, in SHADES OF 
DIFFERENCE, supra at 223 (arguing for legal recognition of colorism claims). But c.f., Tanya Kateri Hernandez, 
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groups impacts immigrants from South Asia and their American-born offspring in the same way studies 
suggest that skin tone discrimination adversely impacts black Americans and Latinos in the workplace.19 
In exploring this question, I examined fifty-one employment discrimination cases involving South Asians 
decided between 1981 and 2014. This article also explores the difficulties South Asian plaintiffs face 
when raising a Title VII color employment discrimination claim. South Asian plaintiffs are more likely to 
use Title VII rather than the older Section 1981 law because the latter does not cover discrimination based 
on national origin and claims filed by South Asians sometimes conflate race and national origin claims.20 
The remaining article is divided into three sections. The first section briefly examines the influx 
of South Asians, specifically Asian Indians, in the United States since the mid 1960s. It also examines the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination and the “Diversity” Defense, 42 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 259 
(2007) (looking at the implications of increased diversity, specifically among Latinos and the operation of 
employment discrimination law); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Latinos at Work: When Color Discrimination Involves 
More Than Color, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE, supra, at 236 (arguing that judges misunderstand “the permutations of 
color discrimination” in cases involving Latinos).   
 For discussions of colorism among South Asians, see Cynthia E. Nance, Colorable Claims: The Continuing 
Significance of Color Under Title VII Forty Years After Its Passage, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 435 (2005) 
(arguing that colorism cases will account for an increasing number of Title VII cases); Shilpi Bhattacharya, The 
Desire for Whiteness: Can Law and Economics Explain It?, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 117 (2012) (arguing for a new 
theoretical perspective on colorism that focuses on economics rather than race); Trina Jones, The Significance of 
Skin Color in Asian and Asian-American Communities: Initial Reflections, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1105 (2013) 
(discussing colorism among Asian Americans in general with reference to South Asians). 
19. See Taunya Lovell Banks, A Darker Shade of Pale Revisited: Disaggregated Blackness and Colorism in 
the "Post-Racial" Obama Era, in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A POSTRACIAL AMERICA 95 
(Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2013) (arguing that skin tone, rather than racial classification or racial self- 
identification, will, in the near future, determine who gets better access to quality education, jobs and real power in 
America); Banks, Multilayered Racism, supra note 18, at 213 (arguing that the preference for lighter skin tones for 
all racialized groups may reflect unconscious or implicit biases); Hernandez, Latinos at Work, supra note 18, at 236; 
Hernandez, Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination, supra note 18.  
20.  The United States Supreme Court ruled in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, that 42 U.S.C. §1981 
covers intentional discrimination based on ancestry or ethnicity, but not national origin. Saint Francis College v. Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). The lack of a clear distinction between ethnicity and national origin has resulted 
in a series of confusing lower court decisions.   As noted in an ALR commentary summarizing cases on this issue: 
“The courts have found no adequate standard to distinguish racial from national origin discrimination, and have 
generally adopted a common–sense approach based upon the factual practicalities indicating a racial bias against 
certain groups of distinct national origin. Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Applicability of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 to 
National Origin Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 A.L.R. Fed. 103 (originally published in 1979).  
Nevertheless, subsequent circuit courts of appeals that considered this issue generally conclude that Section 1981 
does not cover discrimination based solely on national origin.  See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 
1053 (8th Cir. 2011); Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2006), as amended on denial of 
reh'g (May 25, 2006); El-Zabet v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 211 F. App’x 460, 462-63 (6th Cir. 2006); Ingram v. Papa 
John’s Int’l, Inc., 171 F. App’x 439, 441 (5th Cir. 2006); Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 
840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004); Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 170 (2nd Cir. 1998); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 
F.3d 1398, 1411 n.10 (10th Cir. 1997).  
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colorism phenomena in India and the South Asian diaspora including the U.S. The second section 
examines employment discrimination cases brought by South Asians, especially Asian Indians, and their 
invocation of skin tone in many of these cases. This section starts with a reexamination of Ali v. Bank of 
Pakistan, perhaps the earliest colorism case involving a South Asian.21 The 1981 federal district court 
opinion in Ali suggests that intra-group colorism claims involving South Asians are not cognizable under 
Title VII because they fall outside the “American experience.”22 Thus, I examine the cases that follow Ali 
to determine whether and how South Asian plaintiffs invoke “color” in Title VII employment 
discrimination cases. The final section of this article contains some suggestions for both litigators and 
judges involved in workplace discrimination cases brought by South Asians. 
II. ASIAN INDIANS IN AMERICA 
A. Growth in the Asian Indian Community  
Asian Indians comprise the largest group of South Asians in the United States. There are more 
than a million immigrants from India in the United States.23 Most Asian Indians entered the country after 
1965 when immigration and naturalization restrictions on non-white immigrants eased with passage of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965.24 Between 2000 and 2005 the ethnic Asian Indian 
                                                     
21. Ali v. Nat’l Bank of Pakistan, 508 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
22. Id. at 613. 
23. There were two phases of Indian immigration – 1899-1914 when 6,800 arrived in California (consisting of 
mostly peasants who took up farming). Prema Kurien, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics: Hindu and Muslim Indian 
Immigrants in the United States, 24 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 263, 266 (2001). But in 1917 the Asiatic Barred Zone 
Act banned immigration from most Asian countries including colonial India. Asiatic Barred Zone Act (Act of Feb. 
5, 1917) ch. 29, Pub. L. No. 64-301, sec. 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876 (repealed 1952).  Further, immigrants from these 
countries already in the U.S. could not naturalize. In re Thind, 268 F. 683 (D. Or. 1920). By the beginning of the 
twentieth century Hindus were underrepresented in the United States in relation to their proportion in India while 
Sikhs and Christians were particularly overrepresented . Kurien, supra, at 267; Sucheta Mazumdar, Racist 
Responses to Racism: The Aryan Myth and South Asians in the United States, 9 S. ASIA BULL. 47, 49 (1989).  
Interestingly, while upper-caste immigrants formed only twenty-five percent of the Indian population, in the United 
States most Indian Americans are from the upper caste (or claim to be). See VIJAY PRASHAD, UNCLE SWAMI: SOUTH 
ASIANS IN AMERICA TODAY 95 (2012). Although the ban on naturalization was lifted by the 1946 Luce–Celler Act, 
immigration quotas severely limited immigration from India. Mazumdar, supra, at 50. 
24. The first wave of late twentieth century Indian immigrants were the highly educated, fluent English 
speakers who came under the special skills provision of the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act.  These 
immigrants were welcomed due in part to a demand for English-speaking scientists, technicians, engineers, doctors, 
and other professionals. Kurien, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics, supra note 23, at 266. Thus, the first wave of 
Asian Indian immigrants was quite prosperous, especially compared to the population of India, where only forty-
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population in the United States, immigrant and native born, rose to 2.3 million.25  
By 2011 there were nearly 1.9 million Asian Indian immigrants living in the United States, 
representing the third-largest immigrant group by country of origin.26 Asian Indian immigrants in 2011 
were better educated, more likely to have strong English language skills and arrive on employment-based 
visas, and were less likely to live below the federal poverty line than the overall foreign-born 
population.27 The vast majority of children in Asian Indian immigrant families are born in the United 
States.28  
Given the growing number of ethnic Indians and other South Asians in the United States and the 
persistence of race-based workplace discrimination, it is likely that courts will see more claims brought by 
members of these communities. One issue is whether the courts fully understand the nuances of some 
claims by South Asians that have cultural roots and what litigants need to do to better inform the courts of 
their claims. Specifically, given the presence of skin tone bias within South Asian communities, one 
question is how courts will respond to these claims. The next section provides some background on 
colorism practices in India and within the South Asian diaspora.  
B. Colorism in India 
The origin of colorism practices in India and other parts of South Asia is contested.29 Colorism 
practices within the Asian Indian community are “not limited to one particularly [sic] faith, tradition or 
                                                                                                                                                                           
eight percent are literate. Id. Many second wave of post-1965 immigrants were relatives of the first wave who 
entered under the family reunification provisions of the Act. Id. 
25. Kurien, Who Speaks for Indian Americans?, supra note 4, at 762. 
26. Monica Whatley & Jeanna Batalova, Indian Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE 
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united-states.   
27. Id. As a result of their numbers and relative affluence, Asian Indian Americans also have been able to 
develop the largest ethnic caucus on the Hill, the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans. Kurien, 
supra note 4, at 762.  
28. Whatley & Batalova, supra note 26. 
29. Colorism practices predate British colonization of India but were undoubtedly influenced by British 
colorphobia.  Earlier theories, now largely discredited, link colorism practices to India’s caste system.  See Shilpi 
Bhattacharya, The Desire for Whiteness: Can Law and Economics Explain It?, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 117, 124-25 
(2012).  
8/24/15 
8 
ethnicity.”30 Like other societies, there seems to be a gender component that disproportionately impacts 
Asian Indian women’s perceived marriageability.31 The popularity of skin lightening products for women 
in contemporary India (and elsewhere) reflects the connection between concepts of beauty and 
marriageability for women.32 On the surface this preference for marriageable Asian Indian women with 
light skin tones seems to mirror historical marriage patterns of women in the black American 
community.33 But it is unclear whether there is a racial component to Asian Indians’ preference for light-
skinned women. 
Some studies of the light-skinned phenomena among Asian Indians suggest that there is no racial 
connection. Scholars argue that Asian women are not trying to become white racially rather they are 
trying to conform to their society’s notion of feminine beauty.34 Yet significantly, these researchers also 
found that the preference for Asian women with light skin tones may be influenced by American 
Eurocentric notions of beauty and may change when Asian women immigrate to the United States.35  
South Asians were not included in these studies of Asian women, but a few studies of South 
Asians made similar findings. For example, Roksana Badruddoja Rahman examined the role of skin tone 
in the New Jersey Hindu Indian immigrant community.36 She focused on Hindu Indian women’s concept 
of beauty and the significance of skin tone as a status marker in the marriage market.37  
Rahman argues that the politics and implications of skin color in Indian community and 
among black Americans are extraordinarily similar, and the strict juxtaposition of black 
and white works well in understanding the implications of skin color and the definition of 
                                                     
30. Murali Balaji, Not Caste in Color: Dispelling Myths in Our Classrooms, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/murali-balaji/not-caste-in-color-dispel_b_4243013.html. 
31. Id. 
32. See MARGARET L. HUNTER, RACE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF SKIN TONE 249 (2005); Evelyn Nakano 
Glenn, Consuming Lightness, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 18, at 179. 
33. Bhattacharya, supra note 30, at 119-21. 
34. See Joanne L. Rondilla, Filipinos and the Color Complex, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 18, at 63. 
35. Jones, The Significance of Skin Color, supra note 18, at 1118-19 (citing Rondilla, supra note 18, at 67.) 
36. Francis C. Assisi, Color Complex in the South Asian Diaspora, 
http://www.indolink.com/displayArticleS.php?id=062204065913 (“Her hypothesis: that a larger proportion of 
lighter skinned women than darker skinned women feel beautiful and attractive.”).  Rahman found that “feelings 
related to beauty and attractiveness and marriage marketability are partially determined by the lightness of their 
skin.” Id. 
37. Id. 
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beauty among black Americans, Indians in India, and Indians living in the U.S.38  
 
One commentator speculated that although Rahman’s subjects were “‘Hindu Indian women’ one can 
imagine that her findings are applicable to all women of Indian or South Asian origin.”39 This speculation 
seems confirmed by Sarita Sahay’s and Nivan Prian’s 1997 study of South Asian Canadian female 
university students.40 These authors found that, among this group, dark-skinned women and women who 
most differed from “the cultural White ideal” most desired light skin.41 
More than a decade later, Zareena Grewal at the University of Michigan examined the 
“perspectives on interracial marriage and intra-racial colour preferences” between first and second 
generation South Asian Muslims in Michigan to determine “the complex ways that constructions of 
identity are transformed in culturally fragmentary contexts such as the US.”42 She argues that 
“contemporary ideologies of colour in the post-colonial Muslim world are racial, although . . . 
categorically different from western racism.”43 She continues that “intra-racism . . . corresponds to the 
rhetoric of white supremacy in suggestive ways…. [Thus] dismissing the fetishization of fair skin as . . . 
random or benign . . . neglects the power and continuing vitality of the rhetoric of white supremacy 
throughout the world.”44 
Some Asian Indian Americans caution that colorism among Asian Indians and the Indian 
diaspora is different from colorism as it has developed in the Americas. According to one commentator, 
“although colorism is a heavy thread in the Indian social fabric, it didn't negate or automatically 
                                                     
38. Id. In her study Rahman found “three major commonalties between [Asian] Indians and black Americans in 
general. First, both race and caste are systems of social closure. Second, black women in America and Indian 
women’s bodies are sexualized and racialized in a similar manner. And third, skin color and other facial features 
play a significant role.” Id.  
39. Id.  
40. Sarita Sahay & Nivan Prian, Skin-Color Preferences and Body Satisfaction Among South Asian-Canadian 
and European-Canadian Female University Students, 132 J. SOC. PSYCH. 161, 167 (1997). 
41. Id. 
42. Zareena Grewal, Marriage in Colour: Race, Religion and Spouse Selection in Four American Mosques, 32 
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 323, 325 (2009). 
43. Id. at 330. 
44. Id. 
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disenfranchise those who are dark. Nor does it automatically correlate to caste.”45 Others add that light 
skin tone preference may reflect sexism rather than racism within the South Asian community.46 But even 
they concede that the increased popularity of skin lighteners among South Asian men reflects “racist 
biases from colonial times” and “persists among overseas Indians, especially those who have not 
integrated into the local culture or society.”47 Understandably, the lack of consensus about the nature and 
origin of colorism practices in South Asian communities may confound the courts trying to apply anti-
discrimination law. 
Given the increased presence of South Asians in the United States, and the persistence of 
colorism practices within these communities, one question is whether intra-racial colorism claims are 
actionable under U.S. workplace anti-discrimination laws. This question was addressed by a federal 
district court in Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan,48 one of the earliest colorism cases involving South 
Asians. This case, and subsequent employment discrimination cases brought by South Asians, will be 
discussed in the next section. 
III. THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 
A. Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Muhammad Ashraf Ali, self-described as a “light-skinned 
Pakistan citizen[] from the Punjab province,”49 was employed by the National Bank of Pakistan in New 
York. In his employment discrimination suit against the bank, Ali claimed that his employer preferred, 
and treated more favorably, “dark-skinned Pakistan citizens from the province of Sind” in terms of 
promotion and pay.50 On its face, Ali’s claim seems to confirm the existence of intra-racial colorism 
                                                     
45. Rachel Perls, Caste v. Colorism, HUE COLOR CONSULTING (Mar. 29, 2010), 
http://hueconsulting.blogspot.com/2010/03/caste-vs-colorism.html.  Many add that caste among Indians is not the 
same as race. Id. 
46. Lavina Melwani, The White Complex, LITTLE INDIA (Aug. 17, 2007), http://www.littleindia.com/nri/1828-
the-white-complex.html (citing University of Michigan School of Business Associate Professor Aneel Karnani). 
47. Id. 
48. Ali v. Nat’l Bank of Pakistan, 508 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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employment discrimination claims among South Asians who live and work in the United States. 
Unlike many colorism employment discrimination claims, which fail to survive motions to 
dismiss,51 the Ali case was tried before being dismissed by the judge in an oral opinion, but the appellate 
court remanded the case.52 At the second trial, Ali proceeded pro se, “submit[ing] his own proposed 
findings and conclusions.”53 There was testimony by supervisory officers from the bank, two of whom the 
court characterized as “darker than Ali” and three others characterized as “the same color as Ali or only 
marginally darker.”54  
Other than Ali’s testimony about skin tone differences between residents of Sind and Punjab, no 
other testimony or evidence was submitted to support his colorism claim.55 Unsurprisingly, the court, in 
light of the evidence presented at the second trial, concluded that Ali had failed to establish a prima facie 
case of disparate treatment based on color under Title VII. 56 More significantly for the purposes of this 
article, the court explained that even if Ali’s claim of intra-racial color-based discrimination were valid, 
the colorism practices complained of fell outside the realm of the “American experience.”57 Thus “there is 
no basis on [the] record for recognition.”58 The court added that even if Ali could establish skin tone 
discrimination, these claims are “usually mixed with or subordinated to claims of race discrimination.”59 
Thus the court dismissed Ali’s claim for a second time.  
The court’s terminology in Ali, replete with nativism, is an extremely restrictive and static notion 
of race and race-related discrimination. The decision suggests two things: that color discrimination under 
                                                     
51. Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance Discrimination, 34 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 657, 661-62 (2010). 
52. Ali, 508 F. Supp. at 611. The appellate court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration 
because the initial oral opinion “contained no citation of cases and failed to distinguish between fact and conclusions 
of law.” Thus, the appellate court was unable to determine whether the district court correctly applied the law. Id. 
53. Id. n.1. 
54. Id. at 612. 
55. Id. There was conflicting evidence of pay differentials based on skin tone and no evidence to support Ali’s 
claimed denial of promotion and no evidence to support that his demotion was based on skin tone bias. Id. 
56. Id. at 613. 
57. Id. 
58. Id.  Cythnia Nance mentions this point to suggest that the court misunderstood or misapplied the proper 
standard. Nance, supra note 18, at 459.   
59. Ali, 508 F. Supp. at 614 (citing Felix v. Marguez, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 31,279 (D.D.C. 1980)). 
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Title VII, if recognized, is limited to the “American experience”, whatever that means, and that color-
based discrimination is the same as or subordinated to race discrimination claims. Both explanations are 
problematic.  
First, the meaning of the court’s “American experience” limitation is unclear. The American 
racial experience is grounded not so much in a black-white paradigm as in a white vs. non-white 
paradigm. In various places and times, race and race-related practices included others, notably Asian 
Indians immigrants, who were long-denied the ability to become naturalized citizens because the United 
Sates Supreme Court decided they were not “white” within the meaning of the naturalization law.60  
Second, the Ali court reads race discrimination very narrowly, equating skin tone discrimination 
with race discrimination and questioning whether a discrimination claim can lie between persons of the 
same “race” – intra-racial colorism. In so doing, the court uncritically lumps all Pakistanis together when 
Ali was clearly claiming a difference – he was from the Punjab province where residents are light-skinned 
and his dark-skinned employers were from the Sind province where residents are dark-skinned. As one 
commentator points out, conflating color with race ignores the fact that discrimination based on color 
involves treating a person differently because of an immutable characteristic, in this case skin tone.61  
Colorism is a race-like phenomenon based on a person’s immutable characteristic – skin tone –  
coupled with a belief that certain skin tones, usually light-skin, are preferable to dark-skin. South Asians 
have been present in this country in growing numbers for almost fifty years and there is evidence that 
colorism practices continue among many long-term residents and native-born South Asians.62 Thus it 
seems absurd to allow skin tone discrimination among South Asians to avoid the purview of anti-
discrimination laws when it seeps into the workplace.  
As notions of racial identity, whether imposed or adopted, become more fluid, courts must 
                                                     
60. In re Thind, 268 F. 683 (D. Or. 1920).  
61. Nance, supra note 18, at 460-62. 
62. Jones, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV., supra note 18, at 1118 (noting that skin tone preference lessen in second and 
later generations). 
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discard their parochial or outdated notions of what constitutes race or race-related discrimination. Even 
though the origins of colorism practices among South Asians remain contested, , South Asian light-
skinned preference, like the preference for light skin in the Americas, is grounded in the belief that light 
or “white” skin is better than non-white skin. Thus this belief, when it forms the basis for an adverse 
employment decision, should be actionable under Title VII. 
Only one scholar has examined the assumptions underlying the court’s exclusion in Ali of intra-
racial colorism claims among South Asians, but she did not explore the subsequent impact of the Ali case 
on employment discrimination claims by South Asians.63 The next section looks at the post-Ali cases to 
see if they provide any answers or insights. 
B. Post-Ali Employment Discrimination Cases 
As mentioned previously, the vast majority of post-Ali Title VII cases with South Asian parties 
involve Asian Indians suing non-South Asians for workplace discrimination. A quick review of the 
pleadings is insightful. Most lawsuits are conventional race discrimination claims sometimes combined 
with national origin allegations and occasionally a religion claim – Hindu, Muslim or Sikh – suggesting 
that all of these factors may figure into a claimant’s perception of his identity or how he believes others 
see him. An alternative reading is that the claimants and their lawyers may not fully comprehend how to 
frame the discrimination claims in terms that American courts will understand. A closer examination of 
pleadings where a color claim is asserted illustrates this point. 
Only two of the approximately fifty cases can be characterized as intra-racial and neither raises a 
color claim, but two of the inter-racial cases do. Both of the cases involve South Asians and black 
Americans and neither survived a motion to dismiss. In Nair v. Columbus State Community College, the 
plaintiff, an Asian Indian woman, sued alleging that her supervisor, a light skinned black woman, 
unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff on basis of race, color, and national origin, in violation of Title 
                                                     
63. Although Cynthia Nance discusses the Ali case in the context of her larger argument for legal recognition 
of intra-racial Title VII colorism claims, she does not discuss the impact of the Ali case. Nance, supra note 18, at 
458-59.  
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VII and state law.64 In the second case, Delon v. News & Observer Pub. Co., the district court dismissed 
as untimely and insufficient a claim by a light-skinned black American alleging employment 
discrimination on basis of race and national origin against her Asian Indian supervisor’s harassment.65 
One wonders whether these cases were dismissed because the race and color claims were under-
developed or whether, as their dismissal suggests, the claims were meritless. 
Occasionally, pleadings by South Asians allege discrimination based on color, usually more 
specifically described as “dark” or “dark brown.”66 A few plaintiffs described their color as light-skinned 
or light brown.67 Illustrating how skin tone, caste, religion and national origin are inextricably tied to 
South Asian identity, one Asian Indian plaintiff described his “race” as “Aryan-Hindu” and his “color” as 
“light brown.”68 This characterization of identity sounds similar to early twentieth century assertions by 
South Asian, primarily Asian Indian, petitioners for naturalization as they tried to get around the white-
only restriction on naturalization.69  
In asserting color and religion, some South Asian plaintiffs are using physical and cultural 
                                                     
64. Nair v. Columbus State Cmty. Coll., No. 2:02-CV-595, 2008 WL 483333 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2008) 
Employer moved for summary judgment but the court denied the motion in part, finding that plaintiff submitted 
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude supervisor’s proffered reasons were pretextual. 
Ultimately, the parties stipulated that the case be dismissed with prejudice.  Nair v. Columbus State Comm, Docket 
No. 2:02-cv-00595 (S.D. Ohio Jun 14, 2002), Court Docket.  
65. Delon v. News & Observer Pub. Co. of Raleigh, N. Carolina, No. 1:05CV259, 2007 WL 5433774, at *1 
(M.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2007). 
66. See, e.g., Braganza v. Donahoe, EEOC Decision No. 0520130133, 2013 WL 2903308 (June 7, 2013) 
(Indian – dark brown); Riecker v. Donahoe, EEOC Decision No. 0120110392, 2012 WL 5426968 (Oct. 24, 2012) 
(Pakistani – dark); Iyer v. Paulson, EEOC Decision, 0120073337, 2007 WL 4209337 (Nov. 9, 2007) (Indian – dark 
complexion); Gupta v. Chao, EEOC Decision No. 0120081351, 2008 WL 1744120 (Apr. 9, 2008) (Indian – dark 
complexion); Hans v. Potter, EEOC Decision No. 0120072547, 2007 WL 2077433 (July 16, 2007) (Indian – 
brown); George v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., No. 02 CIV. 1818 (AGS), 2003 WL 289617 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 11, 2003) (Indian – brown); Harichandran v. West, EEOC Decision No. 01975112, 1999 WL 767696 (Sept. 9, 
1999) (Sir Lankan – brown); Khosa v. Runyon, EEOC Decision No. 01961015, 1998 WL 37228 (Jan. 14, 1998) 
(Indian – dark-skinned); Seetharaman v. Commonwealth Edison, No. 94 C 4373, 1995 WL 453097 (N.D. Ill. July 
28, 1995) aff'd sub nom. Seetharaman v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 79 F.3d 1150 (7th Cir. 1996) (Indian – dark); 
Hamid v. Reich, EEOC Decision No. 01942292, 1995 WL 112059 (Mar. 13, 1995) (Pakistani – dark).  
67. Gulati v. Solis, EEOC  Decision NO. 0120091332, 2009 WL 1173535 (Apr. 23, 2009) (Indian - light-
skinned); Bhuller v. Frank, EEOC Decision No. 01894040, 1990 WL 1113456 (Mar. 23, 1990) (Indian – light-
brown); Rajpal v. Frank, EEOC Decision No. 01882181, 1988 WL 919614 (June 29, 1988) (Indian – light brown). 
68. Kalia v. Stone, EEOC Decision No. 05890463, 1989 WL 1007049 (Sept. 8, 1989). 
69. See my discussion of this point in Taunya Lovell Banks, Both Edges of the Margin: Blacks and Asians in 
Mississippi Masala, Barriers to Coalition Building, 5 ASIAN L.J. 7, 18-22 (1998). 
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markers to enhance their self-identified race claim. One commentator recently speculated that a Title VII 
color claim may be (mis)used by Asian Americans as an indicator of national or ancestral origin.70 More 
empirical evidence is needed to determine whether this is what is happening in these cases. The bottom 
line is that we simply do not know enough about the culture and how the American experience impacts 
South Asian cultures to draw any conclusions. 
As mentioned previously, two of the post-Ali Title VII cases involve intra-racial claims. In 
Rajbahadoorsingh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., a terminated “West Indian” employee consumer loan 
sales manager whose last name suggests South Asian ancestry, alleged race and age discrimination and 
wrongful discharge by a man whom the plaintiff identified as the same race as plaintiff.71 The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant called him “a thief and a crook”, someone who “could never be trusted to do 
anything of benefit to the bank.”72 But the court in granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment 
noted, among other things, that because the parties were the same race “it is hard to fathom how [the 
defendant’s] statements could be construed to show” the plaintiff’s termination was racially biased.73  
Rajbahadoorsingh, however, should not be interpreted to mean that intra-racial Title VII 
discrimination claims are prohibited. In that case the alleged racial statements were not facially racial. 
Thus, one should read Rajbahadoorsingh only for the principle that claims of race-based discrimination 
must be very clearly alleged and proven. 
In Dhar v. NYC Dep’t of Transp a self-identified former Bangladeshi Christian employee alleged 
that his Hindu Asian Indian supervisor from Gujurat illegally favored other Indian/Gujurati, Hindu 
employees in violation of Title VII and New York state laws on the basis of race, religion and national 
                                                     
70. Jones, Significance of Skin Color, supra note 18, at 1119-20. 
71. Rajbahadoorsingh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., 168 F. Supp. 2d 496, 502 (D.V.I. 2001). 
72. Id at 502-03.  
73. The court ruled that (1) employers' proffered reason for termination of sales manager because of conflicts 
of interest, relating to his side-business of selling and buying automobiles, was legitimate, non-race or age based 
reason for manager's termination, and was not pretext, and (2) employers' proffered reasons for termination of 
manager because of conflicts of interest, and disobedience of employers' orders to stop buying and selling 
automobiles, were legitimate, statutorily approved reasons, under Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act (WDA), 
for manager's termination, which were not pretextual. Id. 
8/24/15 
16 
origin.74 The issues, as spelled out in the complaint and supporting documents for the parties’ cross 
motions, are very complex. But the judge looking at the complaint is left wondering about the 
significance of the distinction between Bangladesh and Gujurat and whether religious differences also 
impact any distinction. There was no mention that the documents filed in opposition to the motion to 
dismiss contained any documentation or reference to expert testimony explaining cultural practices or 
beliefs. Thus, the court is forced to decide the case solely relying on conventional American 
understanding of race. Unsurprisingly the court dismisses the claim. One also wonders whether the fact 
that the plaintiff proceeded pro se meant that his claims were not fully developed and this factor was a 
major cause of the case’s dismissal.  
The absence of an expert or cultural translator to explain South Asian attitudes and cultural 
behavior in intra-racial workplace discrimination claims involving South Asians leaves the courts in cases 
like Dhar and Ali in the dark. There is probably more going on in these cases than the pleadings disclose. 
Some cultural nuances are being missed by the American courts. But without the guidance of experts on 
the history and demographics of these communities, or without more specific pleading from the plaintiffs, 
courts cannot be expected to understand or judge the significance of the allegations.  
What is interesting about the post-Ali cases is that none directly assert a color claim like Ali’s. 
Perhaps the district court’s language about intra-racial colorism cases falling outside the “American 
experience” discouraged plaintiffs from more squarely raising colorism claims. Yet the specific 
references to color in the employment discrimination complaints by South Asians suggests that, in their 
minds, their skin tone is a factor contributing to their adverse treatment in the workplace. The next section 
offers advice to litigators and judges about the treatment of colorism workplace discrimination claims 
involving South Asians. 
IV. ADVICE TO LITIGANTS CONSIDERING TITLE VII COLORISM CLAIMS 
                                                     
74. Dhar v. NYC Dep’t of Transp., No. 10-CV-5681, 2014 LEXIS 134846 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014). Dhar 
also claimed that his other supervisor, a Bulgarian immigrant, favored other Eastern European employees. Id. at *3. 
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The Ali case illustrates that even if courts recognize colorism claims, successful claims will be 
rare and success is difficult to attain, especially for South Asians. The evidentiary deficiencies in the Ali 
case are fairly typical of colorism cases. These difficulties are complicated because courts are uneasy 
about drawing distinctions based on skin tone75 and are unfamiliar with colorism practices outside of the 
United States. Judging discriminatory practices, especially those grounded in other cultures, makes courts 
uneasy because they lack any expertise in or knowledge of these practices. Lacking guidance the court in 
Ali applies a notion of race and race-like discrimination grounded in the twentieth century black-white 
racial paradigm in the United States. This decision leaves litigants and judges wondering what to do when 
faced with these cases. 
The district court in Ali provided some clues. It said that assuming colorism claims by South 
Asians were actionable a plaintiff must establish “a pattern of discrimination by ancestral national origin, 
or by color or provincial residence as actual indicators” to prevail.76 This is exactly what happened in a 
fairly recent case. 
In Muhammad v. Islamic Society, a black woman convert to Islam sued the Islamic school at 
which she taught for race and gender discrimination under Title VII alleging, among other things, that she 
had been replaced in her job as principal by a “light-skinned woman” at the request of a director of the 
school, an Asian Indian man.77 At trial the plaintiff introduced expert testimony on a variety of “cultural” 
issues including skin tone bias in South Asian communities.78 The plaintiff prevailed at trial, and the 
Supreme Court of California, in an unpublished opinion, upheld the introduction of this testimony.79 
Thus, one take-away from the success of the plaintiff in Muhammad, and the lack of success in other 
cases, is the importance of cultural evidence to help explain to the court the full nature of the complaint. 
                                                     
75. Banks, supra note 7, at 97. 
76. Ali v. Nat’l Bank of Pakistan, 508 F. Supp. 611, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
77. Muhammad v. Islamic Soc., No. G036534, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2693, *29 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 
28, 2008). 
78. Id. at *44-52.  
79. Id. at *52. 
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In addition to expert testimony, judges also can use magistrates for more intensive fact-finding. These 
lessons are not limited to South Asian parties, but apply more broadly to a variety of other complaints 
involving cultural differences. 
CONCLUSION 
American courts are not fully committed to recognizing colorism claims whether intra-racial or 
inter-racial. Their discomfort with these claims is exaggerated when the colorism practices complained of 
have their roots in cultures outside the United States. As this country grows more diverse, and as its non-
white population becomes even more varied, courts must broaden their understanding of race and race-
related discrimination that, though grounded in foreign countries, is alive and well in the United States. 
Litigants will have to lead the way in educating the courts.  
Title VII was intended to prohibit discrimination in the workplace based on race and color. Its 
goals are thwarted when claims of some workers go unaddressed because courts remain stuck in mid-
twentieth century notions of what constitutes race discrimination. For fifty years Asian Indians and other 
South Asians have constituted a noticeable presence in the American workplace. It is important that 
courts try to better understand their claims of workplace discrimination.  
